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The famous and oft-quoted maxim "Do no harm" should not be thought of as the first principle of
medical ethics. The documents of the Hippocratic tradition and clinical experience indicate that a more
appropriate and helpful first principle would be "Above all, be useful." The concept of usefulness implicitly
rests at the very heart of medicine itself and the physician-patient relationship. The failure to adhere to this
concept undermines the physician-patient relationship, dissolves the distinction between quacks and
physicians, and destroys the integrity of the medical profession. The determination of useful medical
treatment belongs to both physicians and patients. Any decision to initiate, continue, or discontinue
diagnostic or therapeutic action has both a medical and a personal value component; the former properly
belongs to physicans and the latter to patients. Practicing medicine with the intent ofproducing benefit and
being useful to the patient is far more fundamental than practicing medicine to avoid harm.
Primum non nocere (Above all, do no harm) surely occupies a venerable position
among the principles of medical ethics. In fact, it is not uncommonly referred to as
the first and most important principle governing theethics ofthe medical profession:
"And the prime rule for the physican must be, as always, primum non nocere" [1].
Physician Bernard Meyer claims that traditionally medicine has been guided by the
precept "Do no harm" which transcends even the virtue of uttering truth for its own
sake [2]. In a discussion of truth-telling in medicine, Robert Veatch concludes that
the prevention of harm is probablythe dominant, normative ethical theory operating
in medicine today [3].
In this essay I will argue not only that "Do no harm" should be dethroned as the
first principle of medical ethics, but also that it did not belong on the throne in the
first place. An examination of the historical roots and philosophical foundations of
this famous and oft-quoted maxim will show that primum utilis esse (Above all, be
useful) should instead be acknowledged as the first principle of medical ethics. The
concept of usefulness is an integral part of the very meaning of medicine and ofthe
physician-patient relationship. The requirement that physicians above all be useful to
their patients can itself prove more useful in locating exits from the labyrinth of
certain ethical problems in medicinethanthefamous injunction to avoid doing harm.
THE HIPPOCRATIC BACKGROUND
The Latin expression primum non nocere has been widely accepted as the most
senior and significant principle ofmedical ethics. The source ofprimum non nocereis
usually thought to be the Hippocratic Oath. However, the Oath does not containthis
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.expression, though it does have a statement which is somewhat similar: "I will use
treatment to help the sick according to myability andjudgment, but I will never use it
to injure or wrong them" [4]. Neither this nor any other section of the Oath makes
mention that the physican ought not harm the patient "above all." This particular
statement in the Oathsimplysays that thephysician should attempt to help or benefit
the patient by using medical treatments and to refrain from using these treatments to
harm or wrong the patient. If the physician can be said to have a first duty, it would
likely be to benefit the patient by means ofpositive therapeutic actions rather than to
merely abstain from harmful action. A physician who only avoided harming patients
and never did anything of definite benefit for them would not really be practicing
medicine, which ultimately must aim at making the sick better.
The precise phrase "Do no harm" appears in the Hippocratic treatise The
Epidemics (translated literally and somewhat roughly): "To practice about diseases,
two things: to help or not to harm" [5]. Other translations of this phrase from The
Epidemics are "to do good or to do no harm"[6], "to be useful or not to damage" [7],
and (Jones' popular version) "to help, or at least to do no harm" [4]. According to
Jonsen [5], the Greek text itself offers nojustification for the emphatic "above all"
phrase which the Latin version of the Hippocratic expression possesses or for Jones'
addition of "at least." The preciseorigin ofprimum non nocere as a conjoined phrase
is unknown, but a prominent medical historian believes that it is rooted in the
Hippocratic text quoted above [5]. Galen, the second-century A.D. commentator on
Hippocrates, does use the Latin word imprimis(above all) in his version ofthe phrase
in The Epidemics, but he adds it to the first term rather than the second, i.e., Above
all, to help or not to harm [5]. According to Galen, then, the physician ought to be
concerned above all with being useful to and helping the sick. If the physician is
unable to benefit the sick, only then should he specifically turn his attention to not
harming the patient.
C. Sandulescu professes to offer a strict philological interpretation of the passage
from The Epidemics which parallels Galen's.
More explicitly, the sound-minded physician should work in [sic] the advan-
tage of the sick people, recovering their health or he must abstain from every
intervention in order not to inflict supplementary pains to the patient. To be
useful or to be therapeutically reserved concerning the sick, this is the
alternate obvious sense of the already quoted Hippocratic text [7].
Sandulescu points out thatprimum non nocere includes only the second term of the
actual Hippocratic formula and that it did so because this concentrated, synthetic
form better fit the Latin vocabulary. This linguistic fit, he claims, explains its
frequent use over the centuries, but the true significance ofprimum non nocere can
only be found in the whole of the Hippocratic passage "to be useful or not to
damage." Another Hippocratic work, About the Fractures, reiterates the same theme
found in The Epidemics: Be useful to the patient; ifyou cannot be useful, it is better
to abstain from further treatment [7].
Evenconsidering Sandulescu's philological reason for the absence ofthe first term
oftheHippocraticformula, i.e., to beuseful, inthe Latin maximprimum non nocere,
it is difficult to understand why the formula was not only truncated, but also why it
underwent such a radical metamorphosis of emphasis. If we are to accept Galen's
addition of imprimis to utilis esse rather than non nocere as a valid and accurate
interpretation of the meaning of the original Hippocratic text, then primum non
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nocere has clearly forsaken its Hippocratic parentage. From this point of view,
therefore, the most authentic Hippocraticfirst principle ofmedical ethics would seem
to be "Above all, be useful-or do no harm."
Primum non nocere not only forsakes its Hippocratic lineage, but it also proves to
be a less fitting and useful principle in the actual practice of medicine than its
suggested successor, primum utilis esse. In the clinical setting, the sick people we call
patients want first and above all to be helped. Louis Lasagna has suggested that the
proper medical and moral stance for today's physician is not to avoid harm at all
costs, but to optimize treatment [8]. Keeping patients from harm is surely not
irrelevant to medicine, but it should not be medicine's primary concern and most
fundamental orientation. The concept ofusefulness has not yet received the attention
in discussions of the teleology and ethics of medicine that it properly deserves.
"Above all, be useful" more faithfully represents the original Hippocratic ideal and
present clinical reality of medical practice.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF USEFULNESS IN MEDICINE
The principle "Above all, be useful" rests implicitly at the very heart of the
physician-patient relationship. People visit physicians when they are sick, and not
plumbers or truck drivers, precisely because there is (or should be) good reason for
them to believe that the physician can be ofdefinite help to them intheirefforts to be
rid of the sickness afflicting them. A sick person comes to a physician because the
latter possesses knowledge and skills whichthe patient needs in order to regain health
and wholeness. Yet not all sick people can be helped by physicians and made well.
Some diseases and illnesses (as well as some persons' lifestyles) are beyond the
therapeutic reach of even the most sophisticated and technologically advanced
medical prowess. If one considers death to be a necessary and fitting part of the
human condition, then there is at least one health "problem" which medicine should
not even attempt to solve [9]. Nonetheless, even in the midst of medical fallibility,
ignorance, and error, no one can properly be called a physician who cannot offer
healing and caring, to one degree or another, to those suffering from disease. Above
all, then, physicians should be able to help the sick.
The requirement that physicians should first of all attempt to help the sick has its
own tradition vividly expressed in the various oaths medical practitioners have sworn
throughout the ages. Two different sections of the traditional Hippocratic Oath and
its Christian counterpart mention that the physician is to workfor"the benefit ofthe
sick." The Hippocratic treatise Precepts echoes the Oath by enjoining the physician
"to prescribe what will help towards a bure, to heal the patient," and the text of
another treatise, Ancient Medicine, flatly states that "the art of medicine. . was
discovered for the treatment of the sick" [4]. The medical student's oathfound inthe
Charaka Samkita manuscript of ancient India addresses the issue of benefit in very
explicit terms: "Day and night, howeverthou mayest be engaged, thou shalt endeavor
for the relief of patients with all thy heart and soul." The Glasgow Oath also
emphatically binds the physician to helping patients: "I will exercisethe several parts
of my profession, to the best of my knowledge and abilities, for the good, safety, and
welfare ofall persons committingthemselves, orcommitted to mycare and direction"
[10]. The different versions of the Hippocratic Oath all include the injunction to
abstain from harming patients, but this is always mentioned after the exhortation to
be of benefit. Neither the Oath of Charaka nor the Glasgow Oath contain a "do no
harm" statement.
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Authentic adherence to the principle "Above all, be useful" embodies the crucial
differences between medicine and quackery. Physicians are properly distinguished
from quacks and charlatans by their empirically acquired, scientifically tested
knowledge and skill. Eric Cassell points out that Hippocrates has been called the
father of modern medicine primarily because he introduced the use of science as the
basis for the diagnosis and therapy of disease and rejected medical practice founded
on magic, superstition, or mystical-religious beliefs [1]. The Hippocratic tradition
itselfinveighs against quackery and insists that physicians practice medicine based on
scientific fact rather than speculation [4]. The Hippocratic focus on science rather
than speculation can be seen in the treatise Precepts:
However, knowing this [that healing is a matter oftime and opportunity], one
must attend in medical practice not primarily to plausible theories, but to
experience combined with reason... [for] conclusions which are merely
verbal cannot bear fruit, only those do which are based on demonstrated fact
[4].
Quacks, in contrast, only pretend to have the knowledge and skill necessary to
practice medicine, i.e., to help and heal sick people. They offer "treatments" which
are actually useless for curing or containing disease, and therefore are not authentic
treatments at all. Quacks are identified by their pretense to medical knowledge and
skill and by the paucity of positive, scientifically verifiable results following from
their efforts. On the other hand, someonepossessing real medical knowledge and skill
can do something useful for the sick individual which can be seen in the patient's
improvement and which usually can be referred to and linked with demonstrated
facts. The physician can offer treatment of tangible benefit to the patient while the
quack offers only what is useless.
Modern physicians want to clearly distinguish themselves from quacks just as the
ancients did. In 1912 the American Medical Association published a book called
Nostrums and Quackery which exposed the numerous fake remedies and phony
practitioners available at the time. The preface to this 693-page tome exclaims:
"When the veil of mystery is torn from the medical fakes, the naked sordidness and
inherent worthlessness that remains suffices to make quackery its own greatest
condemnation" [12]. A more contemporary example of medical concern over
quackery is found in the laetrile controversy. One physician has recently suggested
that the "true ethics of American medicine" does not allow physicians to idly observe
thousands of desperate cancer patients being exposed to a drug of "unknown
effectiveness, unknown safety and poor manufacturing quality" [13]. He warns that
the image of the physician will "scarcely be enhanced ifwe stand imperiously on our
ivory towers while they [the American public] wallow in a mire of uncontrolled
quackery." A tightly controlled clinical trial of laetrile, he suggests; seems the most
ethical and humane thing for medicine to do to remedy the current situation. From
this point of view, medicine has a positive moral duty to expose quackery by
subjecting its alleged remedies to the rigor of scientific validation.
Laws licensing physicians are designed to permit only scientifically trained and
qualified persons to practice medicine and toprevent quacks from bilking the public
with phony cures. Daniel Callahan has rightly observed that the purpose of these
laws is notonlytoprotectthepublicfromincompetent physicians, but also to protect
physicians themselves from the presence in their midst of untrained, unqualified
quacks [14]. The state's action of preventing quacks from plying their useless and
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dangerous trade protects physicians as well as patients. Both are harmed by those
who can do nothing useful medically for sick people in need of help.
"Above all, be useful" as a first principle of medical ethics strongly suggests that
any invasion of a patient's bodily integrity must be justified by some legitimate
diagnostic or therapeutic goal which the patient willingly chooses in his or her quest
to get well. Persons are not to be medically tinkered with by physicians merely for
their own education and profit or to keep them busy. Competent physicians should
be able to articulate good reasons for holding that their interventions will be of
tangible benefit to their patients. This should become an increasingly rigorous
requirement as the mortality and morbidity of the intervention increases. A patient's
body and mind (that is, the patient's very self as an embodied consciousness) ought
not to be interfered with by physicians or anyone else unless something useful for that
patient can reasonably be expected by sticking his veins, giving him drugs, initiating
psychotherapy, or putting him under the knife. A person's bodily, personal integrity
demands that all medical intrusions into it be adequately justified by the usefulness
and suitability to the person's condition of the information or effects that will be
produced. (This argument is purposefully limited to therapeutic interventions and
does not directly pertain to medical research. Certainly persons who are given
adequate information can freely and legitimately allow themselves to be involved in
research which will not be useful to them personally.)
Consider medicine's vast armada ofdrugs. The etymological root ofpharmacology
is the Greek wordpharmakon meaningdrug, remedy, poison, and charm. It does not
require much imagination to see that many drugs available to physicians and their
patients are a curious combination of remedy, poison, and charm. Simply put, most
drugs used in medicine are not completely benign. According to physician Herman
Blumgart:
Even the most commonly used agents such as quinidine, digitalis, the
thiazides, and hormonal agents such as thyroid, insulin, steroids, and proges-
tins carry considerable risk ... In the use ofmany drugs, the uppertherapeutic
range is perilously close to the level that causes toxic and other untoward
effects [15].
Most drugs, then, are legitimately called therapeutic because they are expected to do
more good than harm (though some kind of harm-pain, discomfort, organ
dysfunction, etc.-is also expected). Therefore, on balance they will benefit the
patient and be useful in restoring health.
The example of drug therapy reflects an important component ofmedical practice:
many, if not most, diagnostic and therapeutic maneuvers are only proportionately
useful to the patient, that is, they almost universally carry the threat of harm as well
as the promise of benefit. Often these procedures actually do produce harm of one
kind or another, e.g., anti-cancer drugs frequently cause nausea and vomiting. If
physicians were to strictly adhere toprimum non nocere, a great many of medicine's
tools would be permanently banned. If physicians should strive above all to do no
harm (above even producing proportionate benefit), then medicine would have to
abandon much of what is presently held to be appropriate, standard therapy. In
treating patients, physicians are forced to make judgments about which surgery,
procedures, and drugs are likely to yield the most benefit and the least harm. The
Hippocratic work Joints contains a passage which reflects the ancient tradition
behind this practice: "What you should put first in all the practice of our art is how to
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make the patient well; and if he can be made well in many ways, one should choose
the least troublesome. This is more honorable, and more in accord with the art" [16].
Medicine's primary goal, therefore, is not to avoid harm but ratherto be useful to the
patient by making him or her well and to end up doing the patient more good than
harm.
Useless treatment is really mistreatment. Doing that which is useless definitely
harms the patient and can also harm others such as the patient's family and societyin
general. Useless treatments poison patients' trust that the physician will be ofbenefit
to them in their diseased and vulnerable state. Useless treatments also violate the
patient's bodily integrity. Any significant, direct intervention into the body of
another must be justified, particularly when that intervention generates tangible
danger of harm. A patient's family has similar legitimate expectations that the
physician will do only that which will help mom, dad, brother, sister, or grandparent.
When a physician does anything useless to a patient, both the patient and those close
to him are being cruelly deceived, not in words but in actions.
The major harm of useless treatment to society (besides the possibility ofa general
erosion oftrust in medicine) comes in the form ofunnecessary and burdensome costs.
Any medical treatment, whether useful or useless, tends to be quite expensive.
Medical costs are skyrocketing, and unfortunately there seems to be no end in sight.
Clearly, medicine cannot be responsibly practiced ifabsolutely no attention is paid to
the costs of what is being done. Although control of the cost of medical care is an
extremely complex and difficult task which does not belongexclusively to physicians
[17], they ought not to shirk their responsibility to take the problem seriously.
Balancing the costs and benefits of a medical procedure such as computed tomogra-
phy is not an easy task: how, for example, is one to put a dollar value on the reduced
mortality and morbidity achieved by CT as compared with present procedures [18]?
However difficult the task may be, medicine should be careful about what it
accepts as useful, standard practice. If medicine will not and should not accept
laetrile without a rigorously controlled clinical trial [13], why should it accept any
unproven procedure or drug? Unfortunately, there is evidence that quite afew useless
procedures have crept into medicine's repertoire within the last twenty years. Howard
Hiatt has identified a number ofprocedures once practiced widely inthis country but
now abandoned: gastric freezing for peptic ulcers, colectomy for epilepsy, bilateral
hypogastric-artery ligation for pelvic hemorrhage, renal-capsule stripping for acute
kidney failure, sympathectomy for asthma, internal-mammary-artery ligation for
coronary-artery disease, adrenalectomy for essential hypertension, lobotomy, and
wiring for aortic aneurysm [19]. Hiatt notes that most of these practices did not
disappear because they were replaced by better procedures (which he rightly belives
would have been a medically appropriate reason), but rather because they were
finally shown to be useless. No controlled studies evaluated these procedures when
they were first introduced. Gastric freezing of peptic ulcer, for example, was
supported by an uncontrolled study which ultimately proved to be an unreliable
indicator of the therapy's true value [20]. This same pattern has occurred with other
new therapies as well [21-23].
"Clinical efficacy is an important consideration with any new technic" [18]. Surely
this is an understatement. What could be more important to medicine than the
clinical efficacy ofany procedure ordrug?Cost, availability, and safety areimportant
considerations too, but without clinical efficacy these factors are irrelevant. A new
procedure (or an old one, for that matter) may. be quite inexpensive, easily available,
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and extremely safe, .but unless it is clinically effective, it has no place in medicine.
However, Hiatt points out that clinical validation of a practice is not by itself
adequate reason for its dissemination; it must be shown to be more effective than
other practices available for the same medical problem [19]. In sum, even though
randomized clinical trials cannot always be done [24-26], medicine should make
every reasonable effort to verify empirically the clinical usefulness of its practices,
especially since once a practice becomes popular (for whatever reason), it is hard to
abandon. The controversies surrounding laetrile [13], universal fetal heart monitor-
ing[27], and coronary-artery bypass graft surgery [28-30] have all been fueled by the
lack, orallegedinadequacy of, controlled clinical trials. David Rutstein has suggested
that it may be unethical not to perform a controlled human experiment since the
absence of controlled trials may allow harmful (or useless) practices to become
commonplace [31].
However, it should be noted that controlled clinical trials are not the sole
foundations ofproper medical practice. Robert Gordon has suggested that there can
never be enough clinical trials to answer more than a few major questions in medicine
definitively. For this reason, "cookbook medicine" will never become a reality: most
patients will not completely resemble the population of completed clinical trials,
physicians will have to interpolate and extrapolate from published results, and
physicians will have to fall back on their clinical experience and intuition [32]. In
short, medicine is not practiced solely on the basis of hard data, appearances of the
modern medical center notwithstanding. Nevertheless, physicians should strive to
base their therapeutic interventions as much as possible on scientific evidence rather
than on anecdote and what is popularly and often uncritically accepted.
The integrity and character of the medical profession rests on its ability to be of
definite, demonstrable benefit to the sick and to avoid doing that which is useless and
harmful. Conscientious physicians should never do what in their best clinical
judgment is useless-even if requested to do so by the patient himself, his family, or
an overzealous colleague. Physicians who treat patients with something they know or
have reasonable cause to suspect is useless run the risk of transforming themselves
into common quacks, diluting the integrity of the profession, and betraying the
relationship which binds them and their patients together.
THE MEANING OF USEFULNESS
Even if it isagreed that the firstprinciple ofmedical ethics should be "Above all, be
useful," there are many problems in determining exactly what makes a treatment,
drug, or surgical procedure useful. Some of these problems have been mentioned
already; forexample, the difficulty in scientifically establishing the efficacy ofcertain
procedures. One critical factor in making usefulness a useful concept (as it were) in
medical practice has been neglected up to this point, i.e., the usefulness of anything
can be determined only if the purpose or goal at stake is specified. For example, is a
fork useful? The appropriate answer depends on what you want to use the fork for-
eating a salad or driving a nail into a board. Similarly, the usefulness of a medical
treatment will depend on the goal to be achieved and on the context surrounding its
pursuance.
In ordinary medical practice, the goals of treatment are generally obvious to both
physician and patient and accepted without question, and it is not uncommon for
neither party to specifically articulate these goals. The car accident victim wants his
lacerations sutured to prevent excessive blood loss, his broken limbs set properly so
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he can use them again, and his pain relieved. The pregnant woman intending to carry
to term wants to deliver a healthy baby and be healthy herself before and after
delivery. The person with strep throat wants the appropriate antibiotic to end the
infection, and so on. In most cases of medical care, the purpose or goal of treatment
is clear to both physician and patient, and both agree to take the actions necessary to
secure that goal. However, with the confluence of certain kinds of diseases and
certain kinds of persons having unique characters, value systems, preferences, fears,
and prejudices, the goal of medical treatment in any one case may become quite
obscure. The fallacy is to generalize from relatively easy, straightforward cases in
which physicians' and patients' perceptions of the usefulness of treatment are
congruent to those cases in which the issue of usefulness is quite complex, controver-
sial, and open to multiple interpretations.
For example, which treatment for breast cancer is useful? The answer depends not
only on whom you ask (physician or patient), but also on whose evidence you are
willing to accept. All in all, the debate surrounding the "proper" or "best" treatment
of breast cancer is certainly one of the most convoluted in medicine today [33]. Yet
one thing can be clearly identified: the decision to have a radical mastectomy or a
simpler, less drastic treatment involves a weighing of values that cannot be deter-
mined by scientific fact alone. A surgeon may believe that the most useful treatment
is radical mastectomy, i.e., extensive surgery is the best way to contain the disease
and maximize the length of survival, but an individual patient may not see it this way
at all. She may rather assume a possibly greater risk of death and live with a less
disfigured body by choosing the simpler treatment. Clearly, conceptions of what
constitutes useful medical treatment (as in the case of breast cancer) can and do
legitimately vary among both physicians and patients.
Physicians offer people a particular kind of benefit in consonance with their proper
role as established by tradition, education, skill, and licensing. Individuals can be
benefited in multiple ways, but not all of these are appropriate to the physician. A
physician qua physician offers medical benefit to those in need of it; that is,
physicians prevent, cure, and alleviate disease. In other words, physicians strive to
restore, preserve, and enhance health. Although health and disease are troublesome
and elusive concepts, they do at least roughly identify the proper concerns of the
physician.
Even though exact definitions of sickness, disease, and health are still lacking, one
thing can be said confidently: medicine should not do just anything to anyone upon
demand from that person, another person, or society. A physician who would
radiate, medicate, or manipulate someone merely upon request would be behaving in
a grossly unprofessional and unethical manner. Persons demanding pills, hospitaliza-
tion, surgical procedures, or diagnostic tests for their own purposes usually do not
receive much assistance from conscientious physicians. There must be a legitimate
medical reason present before physicians should medically intervene in someone's
life-even if that person requests or demands their intervention. Medicine upon
demand is unacceptable: it would disintegrate the integrity of the medical profession
and inevitably produce great harm. Medical reasons must justify medical interven-
tions which have an appropriate connection withmental/physical health construed at
least somewhat conservatively.
Both Pedro Lain Entralgo and Leon Kass suggest that the scope of action ofthe
physician qua physician is becoming dangerously wide. According to them, the
proper scope of medicine is the health of the sick person, not the goodness,
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happiness, pleasure, or gratification of the patient. "The proper function of the
doctor as such is not to make men good or happy, but healthy. As a doctor, he can
and ought to go no farther than this" [34]. Kass asserts that the pursuit of any goal
other than health by physicians is a "perversion of the art," the goodness or
worthiness of the goal notwithstanding [35]. He.gives some examples of practices
which he believes are not acts of medicine: performing artificial insemination,
arranging adoptions, performing vasectomies and abortions for non-medical reasons,
dispensing antibiotics or other medications simply because the patient wants to take
something, and some activities of psychiatrists and cosmetic surgeons. While one
could argue that Kass is adopting an overly conservative view of health and the end
of medicine, his concern over the ever increasing range of so-called medical
interventions is more than justified. The ethician Paul Ramsey has also expressed
concern over the conflict between the social use of medical instruments and the
medical use of medical instruments [36]. It is not fanciful speculation to wonder if
medicine itself is taking on the function of soma in Brave New World.
To modify a phrase of Ramsey's, the good things physicians do are made complete
only bythe things they refuse to do [36]. There are some things that physicians should
not do because such actions would run counter to a basic norm inherent in the
functioning of the physician qua physician. Edmund Pellegrino calls the canon of
these norms "professional medical ethics"; it deals with the obligations of the special
interrelationship between persons called the medical encounter which is independent
of the problem for which the patient seeks assistance [37]. The proper domain of
medicine, therefore, is composed of certain activities which are peculiarly useful in
the protection and promotion of the health of human beings while the borders ofthis
domain are formed by the principles of professional medical ethics which seek to
insure the quality of the medical encounter and prevent the disintegration of
medicine's integrity. Physicians must have some definite voice in determining what is
useful medical treatment since they have to prescribe the pill, wield the knife, and
bear the ethical and legal responsibility for what they do.
Professional medical ethics creates some boundaries for the domain of useful
medical treatment, while the personal values of individual patients create others. In
other words, as there are some things which physicians ought not to do for their
patients, there are some things which individual patients do not want done for them
by physicians. As the breast cancer example indicates, the physician and the patient
may have very different views on the usefulness of proposed treatment, and the
patient may properly find the physician's assessment ofthe relative risks and benefits
subjectively unacceptable. Patients must have a respected voice in determining the
usefulness of medical treatment, since it is their bodies, their very selves, which must
bear the consequences of the treatment.
Any decision to initiate, continue, or discontinue diagnostic or therapeutic action
has both a medical and a personal value component, though in certain circumstances
one should receive preference over the other. The former properly belongs to
physicians and the latter to patients (depending upon circumstances, possibly to their
families as well). Either one of these components alone is a necessary but not a
sufficient condition for adequately justifying medical interventions. In other words,
patients can and should place limits on what physicians can do to them, and
physicians can and should place limits on what they will do for patients.
Any decision to stop medical treatment once it has begun also possesses these two
essential ingredients. Such a decision does not belong exclusively to either physicians
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or patients, although many insist that it belongs only to one or the other group. Most
of those writing about this issue tend to fall heavily on one side or the other.
Physicians, as exemplified by the following three authors, are wont to insist that the
decision to stop treatment is exclusively theirs. Franz Inglefinger, referring to the
controversy over allowing defective newborns to die, states "the onus of decision-
making ultimately falls on the doctor in whose care the child has been put" [38]. He
suggests that the physician has the most valid prerogative toweigh the pros and cons
of continuing measures that sustain the life of a hopelessly afflicted patient. Howard
Lewis echoes the same position:
The decision to prolong life by artificial or other unusual measures in theface
of what obviously appears to be a fatal illness is one of a physician's most
difficult and lonely tasks. Consultation may be ofgreat help to him, but inthe
last analysis only he must decide the issue [39].
Vincent Collins asserts "it is evident that prolonginglife[is] not a theological orlegal
responsibility but clearly a medical responsibility" [40]. Collins, however, also comes
out strongly against physicians doing what is useless in prolonging life.
To continue an act or proceed with therapy which produces no improvement,
which does not achieve or have the potential to achieve "full human life," and
which is demonstrably ineffective in its objectives, is imprudent, illogical, and
irrational. This is the essence of medical practice.
While one wonders what he means by "full human life," it is cleaF that Collins
understands the end of medicine to essentially involve benefit and demonstrable
usefulness.
On the other side of the issue are those who hold that the decision to stop medical
treatment is an ethical judgment belonging exclusively to patients or their families.
Robert Veatch flatly states: "The physician should never be placed in the position of
deciding to stop or omit treatment" [3]. He would likely defend this claim by
suggesting that the determination of an expendable treatment and the circumstances
under which treatment should be discontinued is "clearly a question of ethical and
other value judgment" over which the physician has no expertise [41]. Thomas
Shannon, another ethician, agrees with Veatch.
Although the patient's condition is a complex accumulation ofmedical facts
and personal values, the decision to terminate or continue treatment is
basically a moral orreligious one and must take into account the patient's own
perspective [42].
Shannon criticizes existing guidelines for the care of the terminally ill for failing to
make the distinction between medical and moral dimensions in the decision to
terminate treatment. Since termination of treatment is a moral ratherthan amedical
decision, he suggests that it properly belongs to the patient, not the physician.
Support for this position has come from medical quarters too. Imbus and Zawacki
have reported their experiences in a burn unit which has adopted the policy of
allowing patients whose injuries are so severe that survival is not only unexpected,
but also unprecedented, to decide whether or not they want to undergo maximal
therapeutic effort. "Our approach ... is based on our conviction that thedecision to
begin or to withhold maximal therapeutic effort is more of an ethical than a medical
judgment" [43].
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The assumption which all of these authors unfortunately make is that the decision
to terminate medical treatment must be either medical and belong to the physician or
ethical and belong to the patient. A position attempting to protect the integrity of
both the medical profession and the persons it serves rejects such an "either-or"
approach and recommends the use of a "both-and" methodology. ln the case of
stopping treatment on a critically ill patient, for example, the decision does not
totally belong to the patient or his family because they cannot legitimately demand
useless or medically inappropriate treatment from their physicians. The same
decision does not belong totally to physicians because patients differ in their
preferences, values, and notions of an acceptable quality of life. Some patients may
want to forego extensive surgery which may offer them a few more months of life
while others may eagerly embrace it.
The determination of useful medical treatment should be a matter of negotiation
between physician and patient with neither party having the power to force the other
to act against his or her own conscience. A physician qua physician has (or should
have) certain ethical principles which guide his or her medical practice. These need to
be clearly articulated in the medical encounter. A physician qua person also may have
certain ethical convictions which are peculiar to him or her as an individual and
which ought not to be generalized to physicians as a class. For example, some
physicians will not perform abortions because they hold such actions to be unethical.
They should not be forced to perform such a procedure, but one should not
necessarily conclude from this that no physician should ever perform an abortion. A
patient qua patient, on the other hand, does not have any particular ethical principles
while a physician qua physician does because of the special human relationship that
exists between doctor and patient. If this analysis is correct, then there is such a thing
as professional medical ethics while there is no corresponding "professional patient
ethics." However, patients as individuals do have their own values which must be
taken into account in the medical encounter even though these values may seem
irrational or bizarre and may lead to a decision which the physician, if in a situation
similar to that of the patient, would not make himself.
I suggest that a workable physician-patient relationship could be constructed along
these lines and that it be called a contractual fiduciary relationship. The notion of
contract is included not with the intent of suggesting a businesslike relationship, but
rather because it connotes that two equal parties are involved, both of whom have
interests, rights, obligations, and the ability to place limits on the relationship. The
fiduciary aspect recognizes the fact that the two parties are not equal, since the
physician does possess the medical knowledge and skill which the patient lacks and
needs and which require the patient to trust the physician. The physician should
loyally work for the best interests of patients and allow patients to specify their own
best interests rather than arbitrarily impose his or her own values on the patients.
In many cases of common medical practice, patients will not be active negotiators
because they have no problem with their physician's determination of what is the
most useful treatment for them. This is perfectly acceptable as long as the fact that
many patients do not actively negotiate the fiduciary contract is not taken to mean
that they never should have any voice in decisions affecting their medical treatment.
CONCLUSION
Practicing medicine with the intent of producing benefit and being useful to the
patient is far more fundamental than practicing medicine to avoid harm. The first
duty of physicians is to be useful to their sick and diseased patients. The goal of any
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medical procedure, however uncertain its actual achievement may be, must be
identified before its usefulness can be determined. Thejustification for any decision
to initiate, continue, or discontinue medical treatment must take into account both
the medical and the personal (i.e., the patient's) perspectives on what will be useful
treatment. Unless their professional ethics or their personal ethical convictions are
being seriously threatened orcompromised, physicians ought to accept their patients'
notions of usefulness and alter their medical care accordingly, since, after all, it is
each patient's own life and body which are directly affected by medical interventions.
However, ifa patient desires treatment which a physician conscientiouslyjudges to be
useless or otherwise in violation of his or her professional ethics or personal ethical
convictions, then the physician ought not to provide that treatment, nor should he or
she be forced by the state, hospital, or other institution to treat that patient.'
A great deal more discussion and argument thanthis essay can provide needs to be
directed at these obviously controversial issues. Was the plastic surgeon who recently
made an entertainer look like the late Elvis Presley behaving in a medically and
ethically appropriate manner? Should surgeons perform hysterectomies upon de-
mand or for birth control purposes? Can obstetricians properly refuse to care for
welfare patients having numerous children unless they agree to be sterilized at the
time of their delivery? Should physicians vigorously resuscitate a patient whose death
is imminent at the request of a family member or even the patient himself? The
answers to these questions contain the essence of the character and meaning of
medicine. Ultimately, the integrity of physicians qua physicians rests on their ability
to refuse to perform certain kinds of medically useless and ethically unjustifiable
actions.
Exactly which"personal ethical convictions" a physician may legitimately use as a reason for refusing treatment is an
important issue demandingfurther investigation, since not everyethical conviction can bejustifiably imposed primafacie
on another unconsenting party. For example, an emergency room physician could believe that it is morally acceptableto
allow known heroin pushers to die without receiving needed medical treatment. However, this belief, its sincerity
notwithstanding, appears to run counter to both professional medical ethics and the legal norm of due process. lt can
also be plausibly argued that if a physician withdraws from the care of some individual, he or she is responsible for
securing the services of another attending physician.
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